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Abstract. This paper uses counterexamples and simple formalization to show that the standard 
CAPM-based Net Present Value may not be used for investment valuations. The reason is that the 
standard CAPM-based capital budgeting criterion implies a notion of value which does not comply 
with the principle of additivity. Framing effects arise in decisions so that different descriptions of 
the same problem lead to different choices. As a result, the CAPM-based NPV as a tool for valuing 
projects and making investment decisions is theoretically unsound, even if the CAPM assumptions 
are met. 
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Introduction 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth CAPM) is a consolidated paradigm in financial 
economics since its presentation in Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Its empirical confirmation 
has been debated for years (Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Roll, 1977; 
Gibbons, 1982; Fama and French, 1992) but its theoretical soundness as an equilibrium model is 
undisputed. As a tool for valuing and selecting projects, its use is considered theoretically correct, 
once the CAPM assumptions are met in the relevant security market (see Mossin, 1969; Rubinstein, 
1973; Weston, 1973; Copeland and Weston, 1988; Brealey and Myers, 2000): 
 
 The capital-asset-pricing model represents one of the most important advances in financial 
 economics.… it is useful in corporate finance, since the discount rate on a project is a 
 function of the project’s beta. (Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe, 1999, p. 269). 
 
 
Numerous contributions have been devoted to verifying whether real-life decision makers comply 
with the CAPM paradigm, and there is evidence that it is often violated by managers and 
practitioners in capital budgeting decisions (Poterba and Summers, 1995; Graham and Harvey, 
2001, 2002). Some scholars are trying to provide reasons for explaining this incorrect choice 
behavior (McDonald, 2000; Jagannathan and Meier, 2002). 
 This paper does not address the problem of corroborating or disconfirming the CAPM+NPV 
methodology from a descriptive or empirical point of view, and does not either deal with the CAPM 
as an equilibrium model; it copes with the standard use of the CAPM and NPV for valuing risky 
projects and for making decisions. In particular, this work aims at showing that the standard 
CAPM-based capital budgeting criterion is unsound for both valuation and decision. In other terms, 
while the current behavioral literature’s efforts are addressed to show that real-life decision makers 
are biased against the CAPM in making decisions, this paper advocates the dismissal of the 
standard CAPM-NPV procedure for project valuation, since it is biased against two principles of 
rationality: The principle of value additivity and that of description invariance. In essence, this 
paper shows that (i) value additivity is infringed, (ii) the net present value is an ambiguous notion, 
(iii) framing effects arise in valuation and decision.  
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 summarizes the standard use of the CAPM for 
valuing projects and making investment decisions by briefly reviewing the classical literature on 
capital budgeting. Section 2 relies on an example of Copeland and Weston (1988) to show that the 
use of the CAPM-based NPV leads to nonadditivity in valuation. Section 3 presents a 
counterexample where nonadditivity implies different decisions for the same project. Section 4, 
relying on a simple counterexample, suggests the idea that one may part projects in the way one 
wants and a different value is obtained for a different partition. While the counterexamples are 
sufficient to prove value nonadditivity, a formalization of the results is given in section 5, where it 
is also highlighted the ambiguity of the notions of value and net present value: They may be any 
real number. (At the end of the paper, Table 13 collects the notational conventions used throughout 
the paper. All examples refer to one-period projects and rates of return in all Tables are expressed as 
percentages.) 
 
1. The use of the CAPM for investment decisions 
 In the corporate finance literature it is given for granted that the CAPM, originated as an 
equilibrium model, may be unambiguously and safely used as a tool for valuing projects and 
making decisions, provided that the assumptions of the model are met. The procedure for valuing 
projects and take decisions is very simple and has been presented and proved in several papers, all 
of which assume that the CAPM assumptions are met. In particular, assuming that a security market 
is in equilibrium, any asset i traded in the security market lies on the Security Market Line (SML) 
and his expected rate of return is given by the relation 
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of return of the asset. Starting from this classical relation, Rubinstein (1973) proves that a firm i 
facing a project j should undertake the project if 
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is the (disequilibrium) expected rate of return of project j (Rubinstein, 1973, pp. 171-172 and, in 
particular, footnote (10)). Eq. (1) above may be equivalently rephrased as  
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is the systematic risk of project j (see eq. (3) in Rubinstein, 1973, p. 170, and eq. (2) in Weston, 
1973, p. 26). Henceforth, we let )(: fmjfj rrri −+= β , so that eq. (3) becomes 
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Eq. (5) means that a project is worth undertaking if the (expected) rate of return of the project is 
greater than the (expected) rate of return of a security with the same risk. In Rubinstein’s words, the 
project is worth undertaking if 
 
 its expected internal rate of return … exceeds the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate for the 
 project …; this discount rate is equal to the expected rate of return on a security with the 
 same risk as the project. (Rubinstein, 1973, p. 172) 
 
 
An alternative present-value formulation of eqs. (3) and (5) is easily derived: 
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In a nutshell, the decision maker should accept the project if its NPV, calculated at the risk-adjusted 
cost of capital, is positive. Note that the second addend in (6) is the disequilibrium value of project 
j: 
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We may then say that a project is worth undertaking if its disequilibrium value exceeds its cost: 
jIjV >)( .1 
                                                 
1 If the project lies on the Security Market Line, then jIjV =)( , i.e. )( fmjfjj rrrir −+== β . 
Other outstanding scholars have formulated capital budgeting criteria: Tuttle and Litzenberger 
(1968), Hamada (1969), Mossin (1969), Stapleton (1971), Bierman and Hass (1973), Bogue and 
Roll (1974), starting from the CAPM relations as well, present criteria for valuing project 
profitability. These criteria are actually equivalent to Rubinstein’s (and therefore equivalent one 
another). In particular, Litzenberger and Budd (1970) acknowledge the equivalence of the criteria 
proposed by Tuttle and Litzenberger, Hamada, and Mossin. Stapleton (1974) recognizes that his 
own criterion is equivalent to that proposed by Bierman and Hass (see also Bierman and Hass, 
1974). Rubinstein (1973) acknowledges the equivalence of his criterion and Mossin’s criterion 
(however, Rubinstein does not directly prove this equivalence so the proof is provided in the 
appendix of this paper). The beautiful paper of Sebnet and Thompson (1978) proves the 
equivalence of the criteria formulated by Hamada, Rubinstein, Bierman and Hass, Bogue and Roll. 
 As a result, in the literature there is a unanimous agreement that eqs. (1)-(7) represent a 
theoretically impeccable capital budgeting criterion. Despite the universal agreement on this 
criterion, eqs. (2) and (4) are critical in understanding the theoretical flaws a decision maker incurs 
by using this criterion for investment valuation and decision. As for now, suffice it to say that 
placing eq. (2) in eq. (4) and reminding that the covariance operator is homogenous and additive, 
we have 
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Note that the project beta does not depend on the equilibrium value of the project, but on project 
cost. This boils down to saying that the project beta is a disequilibrium beta, not an equilibrium 
beta. The difference between the equilibrium covariance term and the disequilibrium covariance 
term is not always appreciated. Magni (2007a) argues that the standard use of the CAPM for project 
appraisal in the corporate finance literature is grounded, implicitly or explicitly, on disequilibrium 
values, as opposed to equilibrium values (see also Ekern, 2006).2  
 The following sections deal with value additivity. If the CAPM capital budgeting criterion and 
the resulting disequilibrium NPV are consistent with value additivity, then, given any two projects 
A and B, we will have 
)()()( BAVBVAV +=+       (9) 
 
                                                 
2 Some authors use equilibrium betas for valuing projects (e.g. De Reyck, 2005), but this procedure does not always 
guarantee rational valuations (see Magni, 2007a, 2007b).  
 
as well as 
 
)(NPV)()()()(NPV)(NPV BABAVIBVIAVIBA BABA +=++−=+−+−=+ + . (10) 
 
If, instead, it is possible to find one counterexample that violates (9) and/or (10), then value 
additivity is infringed and we may claim that the CAPM-based criterion is biased or, equivalently, 
that the disequilibrium NPV may not be used for project valuation and selection. 
 
2. Nonadditivity: Different valuations 
 This section presents an example provided by Copeland and Weston (1988, pp. 414–418). The 
authors present two projects (we here rename them A and B) and a security market whose rate of 
return varies across states. In particular, the market rate of return is 26%, 14%, 20% in state 1, state 
2, state 3 respectively. The probability of each state is 1/3. The authors assume the risk-free rate is 
4%. After having reminded the obvious relation between cash flows and rates of return (Copeland 
and Weston, 1988, p. 416) 
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the authors value the project using the CAPM-based notion of value (see (7)-(8) above). Table 1 
collects data about the cash flows and the rates of return of the two projects and the market. Table 2 
collects the relevant statistics, the values computed by the authors, and provides the net present 
values as well. The values the authors arrive to are indeed the correct values an evaluator should get 
if he uses the CAPM-based criterion we have seen in the previous section. 
 
 
Table 1. Copeland and Weston’s example –cash flows and rates of return 
       
  
Market 
 Project A 
( 100=AI ) 
 Project B 
( 100=BI ) 
 Probability mr  fr    AF  Ar   BF  Br  
          
State 1 0.333 26 4  105 5  107.5 7.5 
State 2 0.333 14 4  115 15  100 0 
State 3 0.333 20 4  95 –5  102.5 2.5 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Copeland and Weston’s example –relevant statistics and values 
       
 jr  ),(cov mj rr  jβ  ji  )( jV  )(NPV j  
       
Project A 5.00 −0.002 −0.833 −9.33 115.808 15.808 
Project B 3.33 0.0015 0.625 14.00 90.643 −9.356 
Market 20.00 0.0024 1.000    
 
 
Now we will see that this example is actually a counterexample showing that value additivity is 
infringed. To this end, let us assume that a third project is available to the investor, say project C. Its 
cash flows and rates of return are summarized in Table 3. Applying the same formulas used by 
Copeland and Weston for valuing A and B we can value project C (Table 4). As a result, we find 
three values for A, B and C: )(AV =115.808, )(BV =90.643, )(CV =203.583. But note that project 
C’s cash flows are such that  
CBA FFF =+  
 
and the costs are such 
CBA III =+ . 
 
 
Table 3. Introducing Project C –cash flow and rates of return 
    
   Project C ( 200=CI ) 
 Probability  CF  Cr  
     
State 1 0.333  212.5 6.25 
State 2 0.333  215 7.50 
State 3 0.333  197.5 1.25 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Introducing Project C –relevant statistics and values 
       
 Cr  ),(cov mC rr  Cβ  Ci  )(CV  )(NPV C  
       
Project C 4.166 −0.00025 −0.104 2.33 203.583 3.583 
 
 
  
In other terms, we have C=A+B so that )()( BAVCV += . If value additivity held, we would have  
 
)()()( BAVBVAV +=+ . 
 
By contrast, we have  
 
).(583.203451.206643.90808.115)()( BAVBVAV +=≠=+=+  
 
We also have 
 
)(NPV583.3452.6356.9808.15)(NPV)(NPV BABA +=≠=−=+ . 
 
This counterexample is itself sufficient to invalidate the CAPM-based capital budgeting criterion, 
for additivity implies )()()( BAVBVAV +=+  for any project, while we have found two projects 
A and B for which the equality does not hold. 
 
3. Nonadditivity: Different decisions 
 Nonadditivity means that different evaluations are made for the same asset (C=A+B). 
However, there are even cases where decision as well as valuation is different. Suppose, other 
things equal, that the cost of project A is 104.6 and rename the modified project by labeling it A*. 
The value of project A* is easily computed (see Tables 5 and 6): 064.115*)( =AV . Accordingly, 
the net present value is 464.106.104064.115*)(NPV =−=A .  
 
 
Table 5. Changing the cost of project A –cash flows and rates of return 
    
   Project A* ( 6.104* =AI ) 
 Probability  *FA  *Ar  
     
State 1 0.333  105 0.382 
State 2 0.333  115 9.942 
State 3 0.333  95 −9.177 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Changing the cost of project A –relevant statistics and values 
       
 jr  ),(cov mj rr  jβ  ji  )( jV  )(NPV j  
       
Project A* 0.382 −0.0019 −0.796 −8.74 115.064 10.464 
Project B 3.330 0.0015 0.625 14.00 90.643 −9.356 
Market 20.000 0.0024 1.000    
 
 
Let us introduce a third project, say C*, with the same end-of-period cash flow as project C but with 
a cost of 6.204* =CI  (see Table 7). We have 6.2041006.104 ** ==+=+ CBA III  as well as 
** FFF CBA =+ . As a result, C*=A*+B so that we should have )*()()*( BAVBVAV +=+ . 
Instead, we have (see Table 8) 
 
).*(508.203707.205643.90064.115)()*( BAVBVAV +=≠=+=+  
 
Value additivity is violated again. Beside the different evaluations we have arrived to, there is here 
a striking  implication for decision making. We find 
 
)*(NPV091.1108.1356.9464.10)(NPV)*(NPV BABA +=−≠=−=+ . 
 
Net present value additivity is contravened and, in addition, the final decision changes under 
changes in the description of the project: The investor accepts it or rejects it depending on how he 
computes the NPV. In particular, if he regards the course of action as a single investment paying off 
the cash flows 212.5, 215, 197.5 in the three states respectively, he will reject it; if instead he 
considers it a bundle of two separate investments to be undertaken simultaneously, he will sum the 
two NPVs and will accept the portfolio. 
 
Table 7. Changing the cost of project C –cash flow and rates of return 
    
   Project C* ( 6.204* =CI ) 
 Probability  *FC  *Cr  
     
State 1 0.333  212.5 3.861 
State 2 0.333  215 5.083 
State 3 0.333  197.5 −3.470 
 
 
 
Table 8. Changing the cost of project C –relevant statistics and values 
       
 *Cr  ),(cov * mC rr *Cβ  *Ci  *)(CV  *)(NPV C
       
Project C* 1.824 −0.000244 −0.101 2.37 203.508 −1.091 
 
 
 
4. Nonadditivity: A different partition 
 Let us back to projects A and B. Suppose two other projects, D and E,  are available to the 
investor. Their costs are, respectively,  80=DI  and 120=EI . Tables 9 and 10 collect the data for 
these projects and provide the values  513.69)( =DV  and 919.120)( =EV . But E+D=A+B, as is 
easily verified. We should then have 
 
)()()()()()( BVAVBAVDEVEVDV +=+=+=+ . 
 
Quite the contrary, we have three different values: 
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This result suggests that a project C may be arbitrarily partitioned in two projects and the value 
obtained differs according to the partition selected. In terms of decision making, the situation is 
chaotic. The net present values are  
 
583.3)(NPV)(NPV
452.6)(NPV)(NPV
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which implies that D+E is not profitable while a portfolio of projects A and B is profitable but the 
profitability is quantitatively ambiguous, depending on whether the evaluator considers the course 
of action as a single alternative or a bundle of two separate alternatives (to be undertaken in 
conjunction). 
 This section evidently suggests that we may partition the cash flow of a project in the way 
we prefer, and a different value for each partition is obtained. This intuition will be formally proved 
in section 6. 
 
 
Table 9. Introducing projects D and E –cash flows and rates of return 
       
  
Market 
 Project D 
( 80=DI ) 
 Project E 
( 120=EI ) 
 Probability mr  fr    DCF  Dr   ECF  Er  
          
State 1 0.333 26 4  84.875 6.093  127.625 6.354 
State 2 0.333 14 4  86.750 8.437  128.250 6.875 
State 3 0.333 20 4  78.625 −1.718  118.875 −0.937 
 
 
 
Table 10. Introducing projects D and E – relevant statistics and values 
       
 jr  ),(cov mj rr  jβ  ji  )( jV  )(NPV j  
       
Project D 4.270 −0.000469 −0.1953 0.875 69.513 −10.486 
Project E 4.097 −0.000104 −0.0434 3.305 120.919 0.919 
Market 20 0.0024 1.000    
 
 
 Copeland and Weston do not provide us with a detailed description of the security market 
the decision maker refers to. We are only offered the risk-free rate and the market rates of return in 
the various states alongside the corresponding probabilities. We now propose one of many infinite 
markets that are consistent with the data chosen by Copeland and Weston. Tables 11 and 12 show a 
simple market consisting of one risky security and a risk-free asset.3 The market is in equilibrium 
and all the marketed assets lie on the Security Market Line. This implies (see footnote 1 above) 
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3 Given the assumption of a single risky security, the latter’s rate of return is just the market rate of return (it is worth 
remind that the term “market” in the expression “market rate of return” refers only to risky securities). 
for all the assets traded in the security market. The market is not complete since we have two 
linearly independent securities and three states. In particular, neither project A nor project B can be 
replicated by a portfolio of the risky security and the risk-free asset, since 
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Therefore, we cannot use arbitrage pricing to value our projects.4 But if we use the CAPM-based 
NPV, value additivity is not fulfilled.  
 
 
Table 11. A possible market for Copeland and Weston’s example –cash flows and rates of  
     return 
        
  Risky security  Risk-free security  
 Probability RF  Rr   fF  fr  mr  
        
State 1 0.333 126 26  104 4 26 
State 2 0.333 114 14  104 4 14 
State 3 0.333 120 20  104 4 20 
 
 
 
Table 12. A possible market for Copeland and Weston’s example –relevant        
     statistics and values 
     
 ),(cov mj rr  jβ  Outstanding shares )( jV  
     
Risky security 0.0024 1 3,000 100 
Risk-free security 0 0   
Market 0.0024 1 3,000 300,000 
 
 
5. Formalization 
 This section formalizes the results just obtained showing that the CAPM-based 
disequilibrium NPV is intrinsically unable to value projects consistently. As we may always write 
kkjj +−= FF  and hhII jj +−= , with Rkh ∈, , we may consider project j as a portfolio of 
two investments, one of which is risky, the second one is riskless. The risky investment pays off the 
                                                 
4 In other terms, neither A and B may be expressed as a linear combination of the risky security and the risk-free asset. 
sum kj −F  and costs hI j − , the riskless investment pays off the sum k  and costs h . Letting 
),( khV  be the value of project j as a function of h and k, value additivity implies that  ),( khV  is 
constant under changes in h, k: 
 
RkhkhkhVkhV ∈= 22112211 ,,,any   for ),(),( .    (11) 
 
Using (7) and (8), we have 
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Taking the partial derivatives, we have 
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whence 
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It is evident that both 
h
khV
∂
∂ ),(
 and 
k
khV
∂
∂ ),(
 are non identically zero. This means that the 
function ),( khV  is not constant under changes in h and k, so that (11) is not fulfilled.5  
 
 As for the NPV as a function of h and k, we have 
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and it is obvious that both 
h
kh
∂
∂ ),(NPV
 and 
k
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∂
∂ ),(NPV
 are not identically zero, as they should 
be. 
                                                 
5 While this proof is self-sufficient, the use of a riskless project is not restrictive at all. The counterexamples presented 
in the previous sections show a project as a portfolio of two risky projects. In general, if a project is seen as a portfolio 
of two risky projects A and B, we have 
 ( ))/(),Fcov()(1/F)( 2 AmmAfmfA IrrrrAV σ−++=  
and 
 ( ))/(),Fcov()(1/F)( 2 BmmBfmfB IrrrrBV σ−++=  
as well as  ( ))/(),Fcov()(1/F)( 2 BAmmBAfmfBA IrrrrBAV +++ −++=+ σ . 
 
As BABA FFF +=+  and BABA III +=+ , we obtain 
 ( ))(/(),FFcov()(1/)FF()( 2 BAmmBAfmfBA IIrrrrBAV ++−+++=+ σ . 
 
It is evident that, in general,  )()()( BAVBVAV +≠+ . 
 
 This boils down to saying that the NPV of a project is any real number. Suppose a decision 
maker faces project j and he is willing to reach a NPV of RL∈ . He just has to solve the equation 
 
Lkh =),(NPV       (16) 
 
which has infinite solutions. The decision maker may then always justify acceptance or rejection of 
a project, as he can part cash flows so as satisfy eq. (16). In general, dealing with a bundle of 
projects to be accepted or rejected, managers may present the alternatives collecting some projects, 
or splitting them into several ones, so as to accept and reject the ones they prefer on a subjective 
basis. This resolves in a distortion and in an arbitrariness left to managers. And if managers are 
unaware of this distortion, this means that decision on acceptance or rejection is left to chance: 
Depending on how courses of action are described by (or to) managers, professionals, analysts, 
clerks, practitioners,6 the decision process changes and turns to a random decision process where 
solution is established by a flip-of-a-coin-like procedure. 
 In formal terms, the notion of (disequilibrium) net present value is an ambiguous notion, 
since it is any number a decision maker wants it to be (or chance wants it to be). Putting it in 
behavioral terms, valuations and decisions should not be dependent on how they are described 
(principle of description invariance). If different description of the same situation lead to different 
valuations and/or choice behaviors, then “framing effects” arise. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985, 1999; Soman, 2004). Such a CAPM-minded decision 
maker just falls prey to framing effects in both valuation and decision. As the violation of the 
principle of description invariance is considered to be a violation of rationality, we must admit that 
the CAPM-minded decision maker is an irrational decision maker. 
 
Conclusions 
 This paper makes use of counterexamples and simple formalization to show that the 
standard use of the CAPM-based capital budgeting criterion is theoretically biased for both 
valuation and decision. In particular, the use of disequilibrium NPV implies that the principle of 
value (and net present value) additivity is violated and framing effects arise in both valuations and 
choice behaviors. This implies that value and net present value are not unambiguous notions, since 
they may be any real number depending on the way one is willing to frame the project. It is also 
well-known that arbitrage pricing is consistent with value additivity (see Modigliani and Miller, 
                                                 
6 The agent may come across an exogenously framed investment or, rather, may frame it herself as she subjectively 
perceives it: “The choice [of a particular framing] depends on the economic conditions giving rise to that particular net 
cash flow and on the psychological factors that influence the cognitive perception of the decision maker” (Magni, 2002, 
p. 211). 
1958, whose Proposition I shows that an asset has the same value regardless of how it is framed in 
terms of equity and debt). But the standard CAPM-based NPV (which implies the use of 
disequilibrium betas) is not consistent with arbitrage pricing for project valuation.7 It is worth 
noting that if disequilibrium betas are replaced by equilibrium betas, things improve but in some 
cases even equilibrium betas lead to irrational valuations and decisions (see Magni, 2007a, 2007b).  
Brealey and Myers (2000, ch. 34) claim that three of the seven most importance ideas in finance are 
Net Present Value, Capital Asset Pricing Model, value additivity; in fact, the use of the 
NPV+CAPM procedure should be carefully revisited. 
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Appendix 
 Mossin (1969, p. 755, left column) shows that, assuming the market is in equilibrium, an 
investment Z will be undertaken by a firm l if and only if 
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where ZF  is the cash flow generated by the project, mV  is the end-of-period value of the security 
market, ZI  is the investment cost, and 
 ),Fcov(
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V
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with lF =free cash flow of firm l (the overbar represents expectation),  lV =market value of firm l. 
Dividing both sides of (A.1) by ZI we have 
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=−1F , eq. (A.3) becomes 
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Letting 0V  be the current value of the market, we have ),cov(),(cov 0 mZmZ rrVVr = . Therefore, 
we have, using (A.2) , 
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which boils down to 
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whence 
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where lr  is the rate of return on firm l.
8 The term
),cov( ml
fl
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rr −
 “is the same for all companies” 
(Mossin, 1969, p. 755, right column), so that 
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As a result, eq. (A.7) becomes  
                                                 
8 lV  and lr  refer to the value and rate of return of firm l prior to investment Z. 
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which coincide with (3) and (6) respectively, with j=Z. 9        Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Notations 
   
jF  End-of-period cash flow of project  j 
jF  End-of-period expected cash flow of project j 
jI  Investment cost of project  j 
ir , jr  Rates of return of firm i and project  j 
ir , jr  Expected rates of return of firm i and project  j  
mr  Market rate of return 
mr  Expected market rate of return 
2
mσ  Variance of market rate of return 
fr  Risk-free rate 
jβ  Beta of project j 
ji  Risk-adjusted cost of capital 
)(iV , )( jV  Values of firm i and project j 
)NPV( j  Net Present Value of project j 
Cov covariance 
 
                                                 
9 Again, one should bear in mind that the beta is a disequilibrium systematic risk, as previously seen. 
